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Lucia v. SEC: The Ambiguity of the 
Appointments Clause Continues, 
Sending Tremors Coursing 
Throughout the Administrative 
State 
SAMUEL A. SCHWARTZ*© 
 
In Lucia v. SEC,1 the Supreme Court considered 
whether the Appointments Clause2 applies to the 
administrative law judges (“ALJs”) of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (“SEC” or “Commission”). Reversing 
the decision below, the Court concluded that the ALJs are 
inferior officers subject to the Appointments Clause.3 
Properly understanding the Court’s precedent in Freytag,4 
the Court correctly applied it to the SEC ALJs.5 However, the 
Court’s narrow holding failed to clarify the meaning of 
inferior officers under the Appointments Clause, leaving a 
trail of uncertainty in its wake.6 
  
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2020, University of Maryland Francis King Carey 
School of Law. The author wishes to thank all of those that made this 
paper possible—you know who you are. 
© Samuel A. Schwartz 2019. 
1 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018). 
2 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
3 Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2050 (2018). 
4 Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868 (1991). 
5 See infra Part IV.A. 
6 See infra Part IV.B. 
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I. THE CASE 
 
Alleging that Raymond Lucia fraudulently misled potential 
clients, the SEC brought an administrative enforcement 
action against Lucia in front of SEC administrative law judge 
Cameron Elliot.7 Finding Lucia liable, the ALJ’s initial 
decision8 imposed a civil penalty, lifetime bar from the 
industry, and other sanctions.9 Appealing to the SEC, Lucia 
contended10 that ALJs are officers of the United States who 
must be appointed in accordance with the Appointments 
Clause.11 Because Judge Elliot had been appointed by SEC 
staff members, who undisputedly were not constitutionally 
authorized to do so,12 Lucia argued that Judge Elliot’s 
judgment should be vacated.13 
 Citing Landry,14 the SEC reasoned that the ALJs’ lack 
of significant independent decision-making authority 
necessarily made the ALJs employees and not inferior 
officers.15 Relying on the lack of final decision-making 
authority, the Landry Court held that the ALJs of the 
 
7 Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, 832 F.3d 277, 282 (D.C. Cir. 2016) reh’g 
en banc denied, 868 F.3d 1021 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (per curiam). The SEC 
alleged that Lucia had misled potential clients with slideshow 
presentations about Lucia’s wealth management strategy. Id.  
8 The Commission remanded the initial decision for further fact-finding 
as to other charges, but the ALJ returned a revised initial decision with 
identical sanctions. Id. 
9 Id. at 283. 
10 The SEC also rejected Lucia’s argument on the merits. Id. 
11 Id. 
12 The Commission itself counts as “Heads of Department.” Free Enter. 
Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 511–13 (2010) 
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.). The SEC, however, had left the 
task of appointing ALJs to SEC staff members who do not share the same 
constitutional status as the Commissioners. Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 
2044, 2050 (2018). 
13 Lucia, 832 F.3d at 283. 
14 Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
15 Lucia, 832 F.3d at 283. 
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Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) were 
employees and not inferior officers.16 Extrapolating Landry 
to other agencies’ ALJs, the SEC rejected Lucia’s argument.17 
 Lucia appealed the SEC’s decision in federal court.18 
Denying Lucia’s petition for review, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit agreed that 
the ALJs are not officers governed by the Appointments 
Clause.19 Lucia’s petition for an en banc rehearing was 
subsequently denied in a per curiam order by a divided 
court.20 Thereafter, the Supreme Court granted certiorari21 
to decide whether the SEC ALJs are “inferior officers of the 
United States”22 or simply employees of the federal 
government.23  
 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
 
Stipulating the constitutional framework for appointing 
“officers of the United States,”24 the Appointments Clause25 
dictates that only the President, with the advice and consent 
of the Senate, may appoint principal officers, while Congress 
may grant the power to appoint “inferior officers”26 to the 




18 Id. at 280. 
19 Id. at 285. 
20 Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, 868 F.3d 1021 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
21 Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 736 (2018). 
22 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
23 Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2051 (2018). 
24 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. While not the focus of this Note, the Supreme Court has disting-
uished between principle and inferior officers. See, e.g., Edmond v. United 
States, 520 U.S. 651, 662–63 (1997) (holding that an inferior officer is an 
officer whose work is directed and supervised at some level by a principal 
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Subordinate officials and employees, however, can be 
appointed without comporting to the rigorous guidelines of 
the Appointments Clause.28 In distinguishing between an 
inferior officer and an employee, the Supreme Court has 
generally held that an officer who occupies a “continuing 
position established by law”29 and exercises “significant 
authority pursuant to the laws of the United States”30 is 
considered an inferior officer.31 
 Revolving around whether certain government 
positions were intended by Congress to have the status of an 
office, early Supreme Court Appointments Clause decisions 
did not establish what is actually required for an official to 
be deemed an inferior officer.32 Not until Freytag33 did the 
Supreme Court directly address the difference between an 
inferior officer and an employee.34 Freytag involved a 
challenge to the constitutionality of the appointment of the 
special trial judges (“STJs”) of the United States Tax Court.35 
Applying the “significant authority”36 test, the Court held 
that the STJs were considered inferior officers.37 The Court 
primarily relied on the fact that the office of the STJs is 
 
officer); see also Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671 (1988) (listing four 
factors to determine if an officer is a principal or inferior officer). 
28 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 n.162 (1976) (per curiam); accord 
Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 880 (1991) (“[Employees] need not be 
selected in compliance with the strict requirements of Article II.”). 
29 United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 511 (1879). 
30 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126.  
31 Id. 
32 See, e.g., Germaine, 99 U.S. at 512 (holding that a civil surgeon could 
not be prosecuted under a criminal statute applicable to “officers of the 
United States guilty of extortion”) (internal citations omitted); cf. United 
States v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. 385, 391–92 (1867) (discussed in Germaine, 
99 U.S. at 511). 
33 Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868 (1991). 
34 Id. at 870–71. 
35 Id. 
36 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126. 
37 Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881. 
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“established by law,” the “duties, salary, and means of 
appointment for that office are specified by statute,” and that 
the STJs carry out “important functions [with] significant 
discretion.”38  
 Although the Supreme Court had clearly held that the 
STJs were inferior officers,39 the status of ALJs remained 
unclear.40 Adjudicating the constitutionality of the ALJs of 
the FDIC, Landry41 was the first court to deliberate on the 
similarities between the STJs and ALJs.42 Distinguishing 
Freytag, the Landry Court held that the ALJs were 
employees and not inferior officers.43 Understanding the 
critical factor in Freytag as the STJs’ final decision-making 
power, the Landry Court reasoned that since the ALJs did 
not have any final decision-making power the ALJs could not 
be considered officers.44 
 Concurring in the judgment alone, Judge Randolph 
argued that the ALJs were indistinguishable from the STJs 
in Freytag and that they should be considered officers.45 In 
Judge Randolph’s view, final decision-making authority was 
not dispositive of Freytag.46 Rather, Freytag primarily 
focused on the law establishing the office, the statutorily 
defined duties, salary, and means of appointment, and the 




40 Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 507 n.10 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 
2, cl. 2) (“Whether administrative law judges are necessarily ‘Officers of 
the United States’ is disputed.”). 
41 Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 1134. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 1140 (Randolph J., concurring). Judge Randolph concurred with 
the court’s holding to sustain the FDIC’s decision because there was no 
prejudicial error. Id. 
46 Landry, 204 F.3d at 1142. 
47 Id.  
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STJs are similar in this regard, argued Judge Randolph, the 
ALJs should be considered officers.48 
 In Landry’s wake, the main criteria for differentiating 
between officers and employees was the significance of the 
matters resolved by the officials, the discretion the officials 
exercise in reaching those decisions, and the finality of those 
decisions.49 Recently, however, lower federal courts have 
been trending away from the Landry majority and towards 
Judge Randolph’s concurrence.50 Finding ALJs to likely be 
inferior officers, the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Georgia disregarded the Landry 
majority’s reasoning, instead relying on Judge Randolph’s 
understanding of Freytag.51 
 A circuit split soon followed.52 In nearly identical 
circumstances involving an SEC ALJ, the D.C. Circuit 
reaffirmed the Landry precedent in Lucia,53 while the Tenth 
Circuit expressly rejected that analysis in Bandimere,54 
holding that ALJs are officers because of Freytag. The dust 
had barely settled on the Bandimere decision when the D.C. 
Circuit deadlocked on an en banc petition to review the Lucia 
 
48 Id.  
49 Tucker v. Comm’r, 676 F.3d 1129, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
50 See, e.g., Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297 (N.D. Ga. 2015), vacated on 
other grounds and remanded, 825 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2016); accord 
Duka v. United States SEC, 124 F. Supp. 3d 287, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
51 Hill, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 1318. 
52 Compare Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, 832 F.3d 277, 285 (D.C. Cir. 
2016), reh’g en banc denied, 868 F.3d 1021 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (per curiam) 
with Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168 (10th Cir. 2016), reh’g en banc 
denied, 855 F.3d 1128 (10th Cir. 2017). 
53 Lucia, 832 F.3d at 285. 
54 Bandimere, 844 F.3d at 1168. 
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decision,55 setting the stage for clarification from the 
Supreme Court on the constitutionality of the SEC ALJs.56 
 
III. THE COURT’S REASONING 
 
Reversing the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit, the Supreme Court, in Lucia v. 
SEC,57 concluded that the SEC ALJs are officers of the 
United States.58 Writing for the majority, Justice Kagan first 
noted the statutory authority of the SEC and the SEC’s 
ubiquitous use of ALJs to administer its proceedings.59 
Stressing that the ALJs were undisputedly not appointed in 
accordance with the Appointments Clause, the Court noted 
that if the ALJs were found to be officers then that would 
invalidate the judgment.60 Briefly describing the Court’s 
guidelines for distinguishing between officers and employees, 
the majority noted that an officer must have both a 
continuing position established by law and exercise 
significant authority.61 
 Dancing away from elaborating on the significant 
authority test, the Court relied on its application of a basic 
significant authority test to determine that the ALJs are 
officers.62 Holding that the Tax Court’s STJs were officers, 
the Freytag63 Court relied on the fact that the office of the 
STJ was established by law, the STJs served on a continuous 
basis, and that their duties, salaries, and means of 
 
55 868 F.3d 1021 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
56 Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2051 (2018). 
57 Id. at 2044. 
58 Id. at 2051. 
59 Id. at 2049. 
60 Id. at 2051. 
61 Id. (citing United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 510 (1879); Buckley 
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126, n.162 (1976) (per curiam)). 
62 Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2052. 
63 Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 882 (1991). 
 
 
Lucia v. SEC 
8 Journal of Business & Technology Law Proxy 
 
appointment were delineated by statute.64 Explaining the 
Freytag Court’s reasoning, the majority emphasized that the 
significant discretion of the STJs to conduct proceedings 
determined that the STJs were officers even if they did not 
have final decision-making authority.65 
 Brushing aside the amicus’66 attempts to distinguish 
Freytag, the majority reasoned that the SEC ALJs were no 
different than the STJs of the Tax Court.67 The ALJs receive 
career appointments, their duties, salaries, and means of 
appointment are all clearly stated in the statute, and they 
wield significant discretion while conducting administrative 
hearings.68 Mimicking federal judges presiding over a bench 
trial, the ALJs and STJs examine witnesses, take testimony, 
and rule on the admissibility of evidence.69 Seemingly 
performing almost identical functions, explained the 
majority, both the ALJs and the STJs have authority to 
shape the administrative record and enforce compliance with 
their discovery orders.70 
 Reinforcing its application of Freytag, the Court 
reasoned that the ALJs should be officers, a fortiori.71 If the 
STJs are considered officers even though the Tax Court must 
always review their decisions for them to take effect, then the 
ALJs, whose decisions do not necessarily need to be reviewed 
by the SEC for them to take effect, must certainly be 
considered officers.72 Finding the ALJs to be inferior 
 
64 Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2052–53. 
65 Id. 
66 The Government switched sides in the briefing stage. Lucia, 138 S. Ct. 
at 2050. Thereafter, the Court appointed an amicus to brief and argue the 
case in support of the decision below. Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 923 (2018). 
67 Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2053. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. (citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978)). 
70 Id. 
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officers,73 the Court reversed the decision of the Court of 
Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings.74 
 Dissenting from the Court’s opinion, Justice 
Sotomayor argued that the ALJs are not officers.75 Arguing 
with the majority’s reading of Freytag, Justice Sotomayor 
understood that the STJs’ final decision-making authority 
was the reason that they were considered officers.76 In her 
view, since the ALJs can never issue final decisions on their 
own without an act of the Commission, the ALJs are 




In Lucia v. SEC,78 the Supreme Court held that the SEC 
ALJs are inferior officers of the United States.79 Correctly 
identifying the Court’s precedential holding in Freytag, the 
Court appropriately applied it to the SEC ALJs.80 However, 
the Court’s narrow decision does not clearly define who is 
considered an inferior officer under the Appointments 
Clause.81 
 
A. The Court Properly Identified and Applied 
the Court’s Previous Holding in Freytag to 
the ALJs of the SEC. 
 
Holding that STJs are considered inferior officers, the 
Freytag Court explains the duties and discretion exercised by 
 
73 Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2054–55. 
74 Id. at 2055–56. The Court’s remedy was to give Lucia new hearing in 
front of a properly appointed ALJ other than Judge Elliot. Id. 
75 Id. at 2067 (Sotomayor J., dissenting). 
76 Id. 
77 Id.  
78 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018). 
79 Id. at 2050. 
80 See infra Part IV.A. 
81 See infra Part IV.B. 
 
 
Lucia v. SEC 
10 Journal of Business & Technology Law Proxy 
 
the STJs, highlighting the law establishing the office of the 
STJ as well as the statutory specification of their duties, 
salary, and means of appointment.82 Through taking 
testimony, ruling on the admissibility of evidence, and 
enforcing compliance with discovery orders, elaborated the 
Freytag Court, the STJs exercise significant discretion while 
conducting administrative hearings.83 Concluding its 
Appointments Clause discussion, the Freytag Court notes 
that “even if the duties of the [STJs] under [the relevant parts 
of the statute discussed above] were not as significant as we 
and the two courts have found them to be, our conclusion 
would be unchanged.”84 Pointing out that the government 
had conceded that the STJs could issue final decisions in 
limited circumstances, the Freytag Court concluded that the 
STJs were at least inferior officers in those limited 
circumstances.85 And since the STJs cannot be considered 
inferior officers in part and employees in part, reasoned the 
Freytag Court, the STJs must be inferior officers.86 
The dissent purports that the Freytag Court reneged 
on its initial significant discretion analysis and instead relied 
upon a final decision-making analysis to reach its conclusion 
that the STJs are officers.87 To read this into the Freytag 
opinion is hard to swallow at best.88 The dissent construes 
language in the Freytag opinion, “even if the duties . . . were 
not as significant . . . our conclusion would be unchanged,”89 
to mean that the court was going back on its original 
analysis.90 In the eyes of the dissent, the Freytag opinion 
disregards the significant discretion analysis, instead 
 
82 Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 881 (1991). 




87 Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2067 (2018) (Sotomayor J., dissenting). 
88 Id. at 2052 n.4 (majority opinion). 
89 Freytag, 501 U.S. at 882.  
90 Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2067 (Sotomayor J., dissenting). 
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choosing final decision-making authority as the dispositive 
factor for determining who qualifies as an inferior officer.91 
Furthermore, argue the Court’s critics, the continuation of 
the Freytag opinion mentions that an official cannot be an 
inferior officer for some things but not others,92 which seems 
unnecessary to a conclusive significant discretion analysis.93 
Using a final decision-making analysis, the dissent argued 
that Freytag is not applicable to the ALJs, since ALJs do not 
have final decision-making authority.94 
A close look at the Freytag opinion shows that this 
argument is flawed95 and that the majority understood and 
applied Freytag correctly.96 The very sentence that the 
dissent understands to imply a new analysis and rejection of 
the previous discussion actually expressly states that the 
court is not retracing its analysis.97 “[E]ven if the duties of 
the [STJs] . . . were not as significant as we . . . have found 
them to be” wrote the Freytag Court, “our conclusion would 
be unchanged.”98 If the Freytag Court’s analysis of the 
significant discretion of the STJs was really irrelevant to the 
Freytag Court’s conclusion, then how could the Freytag Court 
refer to its previous analysis as its “conclusion”?99 At most, 
the Freytag Court seems to be suggesting an alternative 
holding, but the Freytag Court is clearly not disregarding its 
 
91 Id. 
92 Freytag, 501 U.S. at 882. 
93 Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
94 Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2067 (Sotomayor J., dissenting); see also Landry, 
204 F.3d at 1134; accord Bandimere v. United States SEC, 844 F.3d 1168 
(10th Cir. 2016) (McKay J., dissenting). 
95 Landry, 204 F.3d at 1142 (Randolph J., concurring). 
96 Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2052 n.4 (majority opinion).  
97 Landry, 204 F.3d at 1142 (Randolph J., concurring). 
98 Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 882 (1991) (emphasis added). 
99 Landry, 204 F.3d at 1142 (Randolph J., concurring) (citing Freytag, 501 
U.S. at 882). 
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previous analysis.100 Correctly understanding that final 
decision-making authority was not the only Freytag factor, 
the Court also applied Freytag’s significant discretion 
analysis to the ALJs appropriately.101 
Furthermore, ALJs do have some final decision-
making authority at times.102 The SEC has discretion to 
review or decline to review an ALJ’s decision.103 When an 
ALJ’s initial decision is declined review, however, the ALJ’s 
decision is released untouched.104 Disregarding the notion 
that the SEC’s choice to decline reviewing an ALJ’s decision 
is enough to consider the ALJ’s decision unoriginal, the Court 
soundly reasons that an ALJ’s independently published 
decision is considered final.105 
Another effort to differentiate Freytag notes that while 
the ALJs’ decisions are reviewed de novo by the SEC, the Tax 
Court defers to the STJs’ fact-finding upon reviewing a 
decision.106 Arguably, the STJs are understandably inferior 
officers because their fact-finding is assumed to be credible 
while the ALJs should not be considered inferior officers 
because their conclusions of fact are always reviewed de 
novo.107 However, the assertion that the ALJs’ findings of fact 
are always reviewed from scratch is not convincing, for the 
SEC generally considers the SEC ALJs to be the ultimate 
 
100 Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2052 n.4; accord Landry, 204 F.3d at 1142 
(Randolph J., concurring); see also Bandimere, 844 F.3d at 1192 (Briscoe 
J., concurring). 
101 Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2052. 
102 Id. at 2053. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 2053–54. 
105 Id. 
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authority on resolving conflicting evidence, respecting their 
ALJs’ conclusions of fact.108 
Moreover, even if there is a slight difference in the 
amount of deference granted to STJs and ALJs, the Court 
correctly applied Freytag.109 Granting certiorari to decide the 
constitutional separation of powers question presented to 
it,110 the Freytag Court specifically disregarded the amount 
of deference the Tax Court grants the STJs upon reviewing 
the STJs’ decisions.111 And if the deference given to the STJs 
was not at all relevant to the Freytag holding, then it cannot 
be considered in Freytag’s application.112 
The Court fittingly deflected an additional attempt to 
distinguish Freytag on grounds that the STJs have more 
authority to enforce compliance with discovery orders than 
the ALJs.113 While STJs are authorized to punish contempt 
of their discovery orders by fine or imprisonment, ALJs are 
not.114 Nonetheless, dismissed the Court, ALJs have other 
resourceful ways of encouraging compliance.115 The methods 
of the STJs, while effective, are not the only way of exacting 
cooperation.116 Suspensions, exclusions from proceedings, 
and other tactics, are more than enough for the ALJs to 
maintain cooperativeness with their discovery orders.117 
Soundly reasoning that the ALJs power to punish contempt 
 
108 Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2054 (internal citations omitted). 
109 Id. 
110 Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 873 (1991). 
111 Id. at 874 n.3. 
112 Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1141-42 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Randolph J., 
concurring). 
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was similar to the STJs, the Court properly applied the 
Freytag holding to the ALJs of the SEC.118 
 
B. The Court’s Narrow Holding Leaves the 
Appointments Clause Uncertain and the Fate 
of Federal Agencies’ ALJs Unclear. 
 
Properly concluding that the ALJs are inferior officers, the 
Court’s intricate fact-based analysis leaves no clear standard 
for determining who qualifies as an inferior officer.119 The 
Court’s analysis determines that any official whose office is 
established by law, whose duties, salary, and means of 
appointment are delineated by statute, and who exercises 
significant discretion while conducting administrative 
proceedings can be considered an inferior officer.120 Perhaps 
Freytag is also congruent with the fact that final decision-
making authority can also make an official an inferior 
officer.121 It is not clear.122 
Shying away from establishing a clear definition of 
what is required to be an inferior officer under the 
Appointments Clause,123 the Court’s narrow decision has left 
lower courts struggling to implement the Court’s decision.124 
Recent Sixth Circuit decisions, however, seem to indicate 
 
118 Id. 
119 Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2056 (Thomas J., concurring). 
120 Id. 
121 See supra text accompanying note 100. 
122 Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2056 (Thomas J., concurring); see generally 
Jennifer L. Mascott, Who Are “Officers of the United States”? 70 STAN. L. 
REV. 443, 564 (2018); accord Jennifer L. Mascott, “Officers” In the 
Supreme Court: Lucia v. SEC 2018 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 305, 333 (2018). 
123 Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2056 (Thomas J., concurring). 
124 See, e.g., Jones Bros., Inc. v. Sec'y of Labor, 898 F.3d 669 (6th Cir. 2018) 
(determining the constitutionality of the ALJs of the Federal Mine Safety 
and Health Review Commission considering the Court’s holding in 
Lucia); see also Blackburn v. United States Dep't of Agric., No. 17-4102, 
2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 25824, *1–2 (6th Cir. Sept. 11, 2018). 
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that Lucia is heralding in a new era for Federal ALJs.125 
Invalidating the decision of an ALJ of the Federal Mine 
Safety Commission, the Sixth Circuit expressly relied on 
Lucia, holding that since the ALJ had not been appointed 
properly126 the ALJ’s judgment was invalid.127 Similarly, in a 
case in which a Department of Agriculture ALJ’s decision 
was on appeal in front of the Sixth Circuit, a motion to 
remand because of the Lucia decision was granted, and the 
matter is still pending.128 
 Implications of a few Sixth Circuit decisions 
notwithstanding, the future of Federal ALJs is far from 
clear.129 Firmly entrenched throughout the various 
administrative agencies, a total of 1,931 ALJs handle the 
 
125 See, e.g., Jones Bros., Inc., 898 F.3d at 669; see also Blackburn, 2018 
U.S. App. LEXIS 25824 at *1–2; see generally Matthew C. McCann, The 
Immediate Aftermath of SEC v. Lucia on Administrative Law, 2018 
Emerging Issues 8681 (LexisNexis, Oct. 22, 2018). 
126 The ALJ had been appointed by the Chief ALJ, who was not 
constitutionally permitted to do so, but not the commission itself. Jones 
Bros., Inc., 898 F.3d at 669. The Commission itself, however, collectively 
serves as Department Head and can constitutionally appoint ALJs. Lucia 
v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2050 (2018) (“To be sure, the Commission itself 
counts as a Head of Department.”) (internal citations omitted); see also 
Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 512–13. 
127 Jones Bros., Inc., 898 F.3d at 669 (“Lucia v. [SEC] holds that the SEC's 
administrative law judges are inferior officers . . . . The same problem 
haunts this case . . . . For these reasons, we vacate the Commission's 
decision and remand to the Commission for fresh proceedings.”) (internal 
citations omitted).  
128 Blackburn, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 25824 at *1–2 (“The Department of 
Agriculture moves to remand the case for further proceedings, consistent 
with Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018), because the ALJ was not 
appointed consistent with the Appointments Clause at the time of her 
decision.”). The motion was granted “for further proceedings consistent 
with the Supreme Court's decision in Lucia v. SEC.” Id.  (internal 
citations omitted). 
129 See generally Mascott, supra note 122 at 305; Matthew C. McCann, 
The Immediate Aftermath of SEC v. Lucia on Administrative Law, 2018 
Emerging Issues 8681 (LexisNexis, Oct. 22, 2018). 
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bulk of all agency adjudication.130 Since most of the ALJs are 
not appointed in accordance with the Appointments Clause, 
the Court’s decision now threatens to potentially undermine 
many of these ALJs’ decisions.131 
 Constitutional challenges to the validity of agency 
ALJs are nothing new.132 The Court’s decision, however, 
provides a powerful precedent to those challenging the 
ALJs.133 The Social Security Administration (“SSA”), 
Department of Agriculture, Drug Enforcement 
Administration, and the Federal Mine Safety and Health 
Review Commission are already facing post-Lucia challenges 
in court.134 And for most of the other federal agencies, it 
seems like it is only a matter of time.135 
Employing 1,655 of the 1,931 ALJs working for federal 
agencies,136 the SSA is perhaps the agency most threatened 
by the Court’s decision.137 Almost immediately following the 
Court’s decision, a slew of litigation targeting various SSA 
ALJs’ decisions for lack of proper constitutional appointment 
 
130 Administrative Law Judges by Agency, OPM.GOV, https://www.opm. 
gov/services-for-agencies/administrative-law-judges/#url=ALJs-by-
Agency (last visited Nov. 12, 2018). 
131 See Mascott, supra note 122 at 333.  
132 E.g. Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Bandimere v. 
United States SEC, 844 F.3d 1168 (10th Cir. 2016), reh’g en banc denied, 
855 F.3d 1128 (10th Cir. 2017). 
133 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR 
GENERAL, GUIDANCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES AFTER LUCIA V. 
SEC (S. CT.), https://static.reuters.com/resources/media/editorial/2018 
0723/ALJ--SGMEMO.pdf. 
134 See e.g., Jones Bros., Inc., 898 F.3d at 669; Blackburn, 2018 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 25824, at *1-2; Morris & Dickson Co. v. Sessions et al, No. 5:18-
cv-01406, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 30394 (W.D. La. Oct 26, 2018) 
(questioning the validity of DEA ALJs). 
135 See Mascott, supra note 122 at 335. 
136 Administrative Law Judges by Agency, OPM.GOV, https://www. 
opm.gov/services-for-agencies/administrative-law-judges/#url=ALJs-by-
Agency (last visited Nov. 12, 2018). 
137 See generally Mascott, supra note 122 at 305.  
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burst forth.138 Initially, courts largely deflected these claims 
on technical grounds, reasoning that the claims had been 
forfeited for not being raised properly at trial.139 
This reprieve is ending.140 Reaching the merits of these 
claims, some courts have already ordered the SSA to 
reconcile their ALJ appointment scheme with the Court’s 
decision.141 Although there has yet to be a final decision on 
 
138 See e.g., Rick M. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:17-CV-00283-JTR, 2018 
BL 347095 (E.D. Wash. Sept. 25, 2018); Karl K. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 
No. 2:17-CV-0304-JTR, 2018 BL 327903 (E.D. Wash. Sept. 11, 2018); 
Karen S. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:17-CV-00302-JTR, 2018 BL 305890 
(E.D. Wash. Aug. 24, 2018); Crystal F. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:17-
CV-00174-JTR, 2018 BL 357432 (E.D. Wash. Sept. 25, 2018); Iwan v. 
Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 17-CV-97-LRR, 2018 BL 324895 (N.D. Iowa Sept. 
10, 2018). 
139 See e.g., Rick M., 2018 BL 347095 at *3 n.2 (“To the extent Lucia 
applies to Social Security ALJs, the parties have forfeited the issue by 
failing to raise it in their briefing.”); Trejo v. Berryhill, No. EDCV 17-
0879-JPR, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124738, at *3 n.3 (C.D. Cal. July 25, 
2018) (“To the extent Lucia applies to Social Security ALJs, [the] 
[p]laintiff has forfeited the issue by failing to raise it during her 
administrative proceedings.”); see also Karl K., 2018 BL 327903 at *3 n.2; 
Karen S., 2018 BL 305890 at *3 n.1; Stearns v. Berryhill, No. C17-2031-
LTS, 2018 WL 4380984 (N.D. Iowa Sept. 14, 2018); Blackburn v. 
Berryhill, No. 0: 17-120-DCR, 2018 BL 385257 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 18, 2018); 
Garrison v. Berryhill, No. 1:17-cv-00302-FDW, 2018 WL 4924554 
(W.D.N.C Oct. 10, 2018); Jodi M. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:17-CV-
00291-JTR, 2018 BL 346069 (E.D. Wash. Sept. 24, 2018); Crystal F., 2018 
BL 357432 at *3 n.1; Iwan, 2018 BL 324895 at *11; Davis v. Comm'r of 
Soc. Sec., No. 17-CV-80-LRR, 2018 BL 324906 (N.D. Iowa Sept. 10, 2018); 
Thurman v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 17-CV-35-LRR, 2018 BL 324870 
(N.D. Iowa Sept. 10, 2018); Holcomb v. Berryhill, No. EDCV 17-1341-JPR, 
2018 BL 229083 (C.D. Cal. June 27, 2018). 
140 See e.g., Blocker v. Colvin, No. 2:14-cv-02602-TLP-tmp, 2018 BL 
323103 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 07, 2018) (“The Court has concerns as to 
whether the holdings in Lucia v. SEC and Jones Bros., Inc. v. Sec'y of 
Labor impact the validity of the decision issued by the Administrative 
Law Judge in this case.”) (internal citations omitted). 
141 Blocker, 2018 BL 323103, at *1 (“The Court has concerns as to whether 
the holdings in Lucia v. SEC and Jones Bros., Inc. v. Sec'y of Labor impact 
the validity of the decision issued by the Administrative Law Judge in 
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the matter, pending litigation leaves the SSA struggling to 
explain itself.142 The future of ALJs after the Court’s decision 
is far from predictable, leaving agencies, practitioners, and 




In Lucia v. SEC,144 the Supreme Court concluded that the 
ALJs of the SEC are inferior officers whose appointments are 
governed by the Appointments Clause.145 Properly 
identifying the holding in Freytag, the Court correctly 
applied the Freytag factors to the SEC ALJs, rebutting 
several attempts to distinguish Freytag.146 Correctly decided, 
the Court’s decision clearly indicates that a change is coming 
for Appointments Clause adjudication.147 Lower courts, 
however, are struggling to implement the Court’s decision.148 
And the narrowness of the Court’s decision leaves federal 
agencies, administrative law practitioners, and litigants 
wary of the vague future of ALJ adjudication.149 
 
this case.”) (internal citations omitted); accord Faulkner v. Comm'r of Soc. 
Sec., No. 1:17-cv-01197-STA-egb, 2018 BL 275548 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 02, 
2018) (Ordering the Social Security Commissioner to reconcile the Lucia 
and Jones Bros. decisions) (internal citations omitted) (Order allowing 
additional time to respond to order to show cause Oct. 2, 2018). 
142 See, e.g., Parker v. Berryhill, No. 4:17cv143, 2018 BL 388232 (E.D. Va. 
Oct. 22, 2018); Shelton v. Berryhill, No. 2:17cv609, 2018 BL 388233 (E.D. 
Va. Oct. 22, 2018). 
143 See Mascott, supra note 122 at 335.  
144 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018). 
145 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
146 See supra Part IV.A. 
147 See supra Part IV.B.  
148 See supra Part IV.B.  
149 See supra Part IV.B.  
